Executive Summary

This report provides an analytical overview of the recently adopted United Nations Security Council resolution extending the mandate of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO).

The assessment concludes that the decision significantly strengthens Morocco’s position and consolidates its geopolitical standing as a key ally within the Western bloc.

While Washington and Tel Aviv appear to support Rabat primarily for strategic and political reasons, the European Union’s approach is largely driven by economic interests and the pursuit of advantageous partnerships in the region.

Information Background

On October 31, 2025, the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution sponsored by the United States extending the mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) for a further year. The resolution was widely interpreted as an endorsement of Morocco’s position on the Western Sahara issue.

Since gaining independence in 1956, Morocco has asserted sovereignty over the disputed territory and has officially incorporated approximately 80% of its land, maintaining effective administrative and military control. This stance stands in contradiction to the advisory opinion delivered by the International Court of Justice in 1975, which did not recognise Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara.

Algeria, a longstanding supporter of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro (POLISARIO), voted against the recent Security Council resolution. 

Founded in May 1973, the Front has since acted as a national liberation movement advocating for the territory’s independence through a United Nations–supervised referendum on self-determination. Operating through the self-proclaimed Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), the Front claims to represent the Sahrawi people—the indigenous population of Western Sahara—and is based primarily in refugee camps located in south-western Algeria.

In 1984, Morocco withdrew from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), predecessor of the African Union (AU), following the organisation’s recognition of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. After a 33-year absence, Morocco rejoined the AU in 2017.

The approved document notably omits any provision for the independence of the Sahrawi people, representing the strongest expression of international support to date for Moroccan sovereignty over the disputed territory.

During the same week, demonstrations were held in the Sahrawi refugee camps in Algeria, where participants reaffirmed their commitment to the struggle for self-determination. In response to the draft resolution, the POLISARIO Front declared that it would refuse to engage in any process aimed at legitimising Morocco’s illegal military occupation, stating that peace can never be achieved by rewarding expansionism.

Why is Western Sahara strategic?

• Phosphates: Western Sahara (Bouehria fields) is home to large phosphate deposits. Phosphate is a strategic fertiliser feedstock with global market implications; control secures export revenue and industrial feedstock for Morocco’s fertiliser and food-security strategies.
• Fisheries: The Atlantic shelf off Western Sahara is a fertile fishing ground. Access to fisheries is economically significant and politically sensitive (EU–Morocco fishing agreements have been legally contested because they affected Western Saharan waters).
• Prospective hydrocarbons/minerals: Licensing and exploration have been intermittent; potential offshore hydrocarbons remain a policy driver even if proven commercial volumes are uncertain. (Strategic planners should treat hydrocarbon potential as a latent but politically important factor — it shapes investment, foreign partnerships and maritime claims.)
• Extended Atlantic coastline & ports: Control of Laayoune and Dakhla gives Morocco a longer Atlantic frontage and potential to project economic and maritime influence southwards toward West Africa and across the Atlantic. Morocco has invested in major southern port and infrastructure projects (notably the Dakhla Atlantic port project) to create trade hubs, fisheries bases and energy links — projects that have clear dual (civilian + strategic) value.
• Maritime Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs): Control translates into maritime claims and EEZs valuable for fisheries, potential seabed resources and future blue-economy projects. This affects EU and African fisheries diplomacy and naval presence requirements.
• Territorial integrity = regime legitimacy: For Morocco, Western Sahara is core to national narrative and dynastic legitimacy. Loss or perceived weakness on this issue carries high political cost domestically and can destabilise the regime’s standing. That makes Moroccan positions inflexible and raises the political price of concessions.
• Refugees & leverage: For Algeria, hosting of Polisario-administered refugee camps (Tindouf) creates a long-term instrument of influence and a humanitarian/political issue that Algeria can use in diplomacy and international fora. Anti-colonial posture and solidarity with Sahrawi self-determination enhance Algeria’s regional standing among some African and Non-Aligned states. Moreover, the country needs to prevent Morocco from achieving uncontested regional hegemony or enhanced access to the Atlantic and West Africa.
• Security implications: The area is a locus for trans-Saharan criminal networks, migration flows to Europe, and port/EEZ protection needs. Greater Moroccan control aims to secure borders and maritime approaches; Algeria fears the implications for its own southern frontier and influence.

Geopolitical scenario

Over the years, Rabat has pursued a range of policies aimed at consolidating its de facto control over Western Sahara. These include the implementation of large-scale infrastructure projects—most notably the Dakhla Atlantic Port and a 1,055-kilometre motorway—as well as initiatives encouraging Moroccan citizens to settle in the territory and join the local workforce.

The United States recognised Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara in December 2020, under the Trump Administration, in exchange for the normalisation of diplomatic relations between Morocco and Israel as part of the Abraham Accords. In July 2023, Israel also officially recognised Morocco’s sovereignty over the disputed territory and announced its intention to open a consulate in Dakhla.

Algeria, a staunch supporter of the POLISARIO Front, opposed the recent UN Security Council resolution.

Algiers remains one of Russia’s primary arms purchasers, sourcing over 70% of its military equipment from Moscow, with which it maintains robust energy and defence cooperation agreements and participates in joint military exercises (for instance Desert Shield 2022). Between 2022 and 2023, Algeria further strengthened its political coordination with Russia, including through a Declaration on Enhanced Strategic Partnership and becoming a member of the New Development Bank (NDB), a BRICS-established institution. It is reasonable to assess that in the post-Ukraine conflict context, Algeria’s close alignment with Moscow has adversely affected its standing with Western powers.

In contrast, Morocco is a key ally of the United States and Western countries. It regularly hosts NATO exercises such as African Lion and holds the status of “Major Non-NATO Ally” granted by Washington. Rabat’s decision to normalise relations with Israel in 2020 further consolidated its alignment with the pro-Western bloc in the Middle East and North Africa. Accordingly, the recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara by both Washington and Tel Aviv can be interpreted as a political and strategic reward intended to reinforce a stable, pro-Western ally in the Maghreb and to contain Russian and Algerian influence in the region.

While Russia, China, and Pakistan abstained from voting on the recent resolution, it received the backing of most European Union member states and an increasing number of African allies—partly motivated by economic interests such as fisheries agreements with Rabat.

Since Morocco’s 1975 invasion of Western Sahara, reports indicate that the authorities have systematically employed enforced disappearances as a means of repression and to suppress Sahrawi aspirations for self-determination. Detainees have allegedly been held in inhumane conditions within secret detention centres, where many perished. Their families have been unable to locate burial sites, and the deaths remain unacknowledged by Moroccan authorities. According to a report published on October 10, 2025 by the United Nations Committee on Enforced Disappearances (UN CED), several Moroccan officials implicated in such practices continue to hold positions of power. Moroccan authorities, in line with this narrative, often deny the existence of Western Sahara altogether, referring to it instead as Morocco’s “Southern Provinces.”

The increasing tendency among European countries to implicitly recognise Morocco’s control over Western Sahara—despite persistent human rights concerns—appears driven by strategic interests in the region, as well as by Rabat’s stronger pro-Western orientation compared with Algiers.

Western Sahara is rich in natural resources. Its fertile soil contains vast phosphate reserves, making Morocco one of the world’s leading suppliers. The territory also boasts a 1,200-kilometre coastline among the most productive fishing zones globally. The Dakhla Atlantic Port is expected to further enhance Morocco’s capacity to exploit and export these resources. European vessels are already authorised to fish off the disputed coast under the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement between the EU and Morocco. However, this arrangement has been controversial, as it overlooks the Sahrawi people’s right to access and benefit from their natural resources. In 2024, the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled in favour of the UN-recognised representation of the people of Western Sahara, the Polisario Front, determining that the agreement violated the rights of the inhabitants of Western Sahara.

Among African states, growing support for Morocco’s control over the territory is likely to be driven by two main factors: Rabat’s strengthened ties with Western powers, and King Mohammed VI’s strategic vision to establish a trade corridor through Mauritania linking the Sahel countries to the Dakhla Atlantic Port. This project would provide landlocked states such as Mali, Chad, and Niger with maritime access, although port operations will remain exposed to risks associated with jihadist insurgencies and regional instability.

Conclusion

In an increasingly polarised geopolitical environment, Morocco is emerging as a key ally of the Western bloc. Within its relationship with the United States, a framework of reciprocal strategic concessions has been established: Rabat’s acceptance to normalise relations with Israel, thereby advancing Washington’s regional agenda in the Middle East and North Africa, has secured US and Israeli support for Morocco’s sovereignty claims—currently exercised through invasion and de facto control—over Western Sahara.

In its dealings with Europe, economic interests such as fisheries agreements and phosphate exploitation have converged with the continent’s broader objective of containing Russian-aligned regional actors, notably Algeria. Nonetheless, differing national positions within the European Union persist. While countries such as France and Finland have publicly stated that autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty represents a viable starting point for resolving the dispute, others—such as Italy, which maintains significant bilateral relations with both Rabat and Algiers—are likely to find it challenging to align decisively with either side.

It is therefore foreseeable that, in the near term, Morocco will adopt a more assertive diplomatic posture towards these ‘undecided’ states in an effort to secure formal recognition of its sovereignty over Western Sahara.