Executive Summary

The XII Summit of the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS), convened in Qabala (scheduled to open 7 October), signals a deliberate push by Ankara and Baku to translate cultural-ethnic affinity into tangible geopolitical influence.

Immediate key results relate to transport and logistics, the symbolic validation of observer members, and institutional development under Azerbaijani and Turkish leadership.

Projects that are economically beneficial but politically delicate enhance the organisation’s strategic position while also subjecting it to limitations imposed by EU legal standards, concerns about Armenian sovereignty, Iran’s regional sensitivities, and rival Eurasian connectivity projects.

Essential Findings

1. OTS is moving from cultural architecture towards strategic instrumentality. The summit emphasised institutional consolidation (International Turkic Academy, TÜRKSOY, TÜRKPA, Investment Fund, Heritage Foundation) and operational cooperation in transport and logistics, showing an intent to convert shared identity into a coordinated geopolitical posture capable of influencing regional trade and security dynamics.
2. Transport corridors are the organisation’s principal vector of influence. Implementing action plans to resolve Trans-Caspian rail bottlenecks, coupled with diplomatic and rhetorical support for the Zangezur/Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), positions Azerbaijan and Turkey as crucial transit hubs. This has the potential to restructure Europe–Asia freight routes, diversify supply chains, and present alternatives to current Chinese and Russian corridor projects.
3. The symbolic inclusion of Northern Cyprus is a message to the international arena. Engagement at a high level with the leadership of Turkish Cyprus, coupled with Ankara’s explicit rhetorical support, functions to normalise the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)’s place in Turkic multilateralism.
4. Strategic competition and constraint are simultaneous realities. The Middle Corridor projects pose competitive challenges to Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Moscow’s International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), although infrastructural, legal, and political challenges impede immediate replacement and suggest a prolonged period of competition rather than a swift realignment.

Context

The summit, held in Qabala (historically resonant and deliberately chosen as a site of national historic reference), assembled heads of state from the five OTS members — Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey and Uzbekistan — alongside observers including Hungary, Turkmenistan and the Turkish Cypriot leadership.

Azerbaijani representatives welcomed the early arrivals, including Ersin Tatar, the Turkish Cypriot leader, and Tahsin Ertugruloglu, his “foreign minister”. The agenda, contextualised by prior declarations in Budapest and recent EU-Central Asia diplomatic engagement, centred on “Regional Peace and Security”, institutional deepening and concrete transport/logistics initiatives such as an action plan for the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (Middle Corridor) and promotion of the Zangezur/TRIPP conceptual corridor.

Political Scenario

• Turkey seeks leadership of a pan-Turkic political economy bloc. Ankara leverages historical-cultural ties to expand strategic reach from Central Asia to the Mediterranean Sea, using OTS platforms to build diplomatic legitimacy and networked influence.
• Azerbaijan pursues regional centrality. As incoming chair, Baku combines symbolic memory politics (Qabala fits with Azerbaijani historical narratives of Caucasian Albania) with pragmatic priorities, energy corridors and transport connectivity, that enhance its value to European partners.
• Central Asian states and observers balance interests. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan have publicly restated their support for UN Security Council resolutions concerning Cyprus, and they are taking a cautious approach. The Central Asian republics are prioritising economic partnerships while preventing any major diplomatic breakdowns with the EU or Russia. Hungary’s observer status provides an EU linkage that Ankara can exploit diplomatically.
• The summit is a calibrated exercise in diplomacy and geopolitics. Baku, thanks to Ankara’s direct support, shows capacity to convene and to normalise contested actors without breaching formal international legal thresholds. This plan puts pressure on EU members Cyprus and Greece while creating another diplomatic approach to resolve regional conflicts like those in the Eastern Mediterranean and between Armenia and Azerbaijan. At the same time, the diverse foreign policy priorities of the Central Asian members limit the OTS’s capacity to transform its stated unity into consistent political decisions.

Economic Scenario

• Connectivity and transit fees. The Middle Corridor and related initiatives offer potential revenue streams through freight transit, port and rail fees, and ancillary logistics services. They also provide Europe with route diversification that is economically attractive in times of supply-chain disruption.
• Investment and institutional finance. The OTS Investment Fund and associated institutional frameworks facilitate collaborative projects; however, overcoming the limitations of Caspian transshipment and improving multimodal interfaces requires a substantial investment.
• Logistics friction. The Middle Corridor uses multiple modes of transport and faces practical issues like transshipment, restricted Caspian ferry capacity, varying track gauges, and customs delays. These challenges drive up costs and make the corridor less competitive compared to sea routes.
• External investment competition. Chinese BRI financing in Central Asia and Russian stakes in INSTC projects present entrenched economic competitors. Before investing significant capital, private and sovereign investors will contemplate political risks like territorial disputes and legal uncertainties.

Security Scenario

• Political/sovereign disputes. Armenian sovereignty issues regarding transit through Zangezur/TRIPP, combined with internal instability in transit countries, present high political risks that could halt operations or trigger armed conflicts.
• Regional challenges. Iran’s concern about corridors near Armenian borders, combined with Russia’s desire to maintain transport importance, can affect the OTS transport projects and Ankara’s logistic strategy in the region.
• Non-state risks and infrastructure vulnerability. In a conflict with limited violence or a grey-zone operation, adversaries would likely target crucial infrastructure like ports, rail terminals, and bridges, which would make it harder for shippers and investors to assess risks.

Assessment

The Qabala summit pushes the Organisation of the Turkic States, developing it from a cultural organisation into a strategically important regional force, and strengthens the capacity of Ankara and Baku to influence connectivity discussions and propose viable substitutes for current Eurasian pathways.

Despite this, a significant strategic reshaping of Eurasian transport leadership will be slow, challenged, and subject to certain conditions. This action increases the likelihood of ongoing geopolitical tension, particularly with Iran, and indirectly with Russia and China, which will compel outside actors like the EU and the United States to reevaluate their strategic investments and diplomatic strategies in the South Caucasus and Central Asia.

The OTS-backed corridors have the potential to become long-lasting tools of regional influence if the Turkic states successfully implements credible legal guarantees, security arrangements, and targeted infrastructure investment. But without those elements, the corridors will remain politically important, yet operationally vulnerable options.