Executive Summary
This report assesses China’s invitation to Taliban Defence Minister Mullah Yaqoub Mujahid against the backdrop of US interest in regaining access to Bagram Air Base.
The report explains Beijing’s plan to stop Washington from coming back into Afghan territory, using financial and political strategies; meanwhile, the United States are trying to regain territory inside Afghanistan by pressure the Taliban.
The research reveals increasing competition for Afghanistan’s strategic importance, influenced by Russia’s recognition of the Taliban and ongoing terrorist threats, which impact the economic and security conditions.
Key Takeaways
- China seeks to engage Mullah Yaqoub to prevent Taliban collaboration with the United States and secure economic interests.
- Mullah Yaqoub’s unlisted status on UN sanctions lists renders him a pragmatic and mobile channel for external actors; both Beijing and Washington appear to view him as a potential lever inside the Taliban.
- Following Russia’s Taliban recognition, Central Asia’s engagement creates infrastructure projects, although terrorism is still a threat in the country.
Background Information
In the last days, Farsi language sources revealed China invited Mullah Yaqoub Mujahid, the Taliban’s Defence Minister, to travel to Beijing. The Russian outlet Nezavisimaya Gazeta corroborated the invitation and linked it to recent US President Donald Trump’s comment about reclaiming or re-establishing control at Bagram Air Base.
In an unannounced trip to Qatar, the Taliban’s Defence Minister met with officials and purportedly discussed Bagram, with Qatar apparently acting as a US representative in these conversations. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the leader of the Hezbi Islami Afghanistan, commented US attempt to re-establish its military presence in the Bagram Air Base as a proxy declaration of war on China.
In the last period, several regional and international actors have increased their engagement with the Taliban. Beijing attempted to tie Afghanistan into the Belt and Road Initiative and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). In July 2025, the Russian Federation formally recognised the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan after hosting Taliban delegations in forums such as the Kazan Forum 2025 and SPIEF 2025. Central Asian republics have raised diplomatic engagement and explored Afghan routes for infrastructure, logistics and energy projects.
Despite the optimistic developments in the Taliban’s interactions with international actors, terrorism still threatens Afghanistan. Indeed, in August 2025, the Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, Sergei Shoigu, underlined there are 23,000 terrorists in Afghanistan, including groups identified as Islamic State Wilayat Khorasan (ISKP) and training camps linked to Al-Qaeda.
Geopolitical Scenario
China’s priority is to protect its nearby strategic interests and prevent the United States from regaining a presence at Bagram, which Beijing views as a threat to its key locations.
China may have chosen Mullah Yaqoub Mujahid because of his pragmatic standing and familial ties to the Taliban’s founder. With Foreign Minister Mullah Amir Khan Muttaqi constrained by UN sanctions and restricted travel, Yaqoub offers Beijing a more practical channel for engagement with the Taliban.
Beijing maintains a consistent involvement in Afghanistan, primarily from an economic perspective. Its key interest lies in Afghanistan’s vast natural resources and mineral wealth. China considers securing access to these resources and maintaining regional stability as strategically vital.
From a security and military point of view, China’s imperative is to avoid any US presence in Afghanistan, particularly in strategically sensitive military and logistical hubs such as Bagram. As explicitly noted by President Trump, the Bagram Air Base lies in relative proximity to some of China’s principal nuclear facilities, giving the base significant geopolitical weight.
Washington’s plan involves using political and persuasive tactics to convince the Taliban to allow a return to Bagram. However, this approach and Washington’s desire for Bagram face several constraints. Firstly, a renewed US presence at Bagram would directly undermine the Taliban’s authority, as they have strongly tied it to their narrative of expelling American forces in August 2021. Second, a US presence at Bagram risks its personnel becoming targets of hostility from the Taliban and other militant groups operating in Afghanistan.
Furthermore, Moscow would disapprove of a US return. Given the present global dynamics, Russia and China might collaborate to limit US power by aiding the Taliban through diplomacy and financial support. Through investment, diplomatic engagement, and alternative forms of cooperation, both Beijing and Moscow may work to prevent Washington from regaining control of Bagram Air Base.
Indicators to Monitor
- Confirmation of Mullah Yaqoub’s travel to Beijing and any publicised agreements, memoranda or concessionary offers.
- Official Chinese statements at the UN Security Council or other forums explicitly pledging support or sanction relief for the Taliban.
- Any Chinese economic contracts or project announcements linking Afghan territory to the Belt and Road Initiative or the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.
- US diplomatic or military communications regarding Bagram, including delegation visits to Kabul or formal requests to Afghan authorities.
- Russia’s future bilateral actions, trade, and forum outcomes post-2025 recognition.
- Jihadist propaganda regarding the Taliban and any foreign involvement in Afghanistan.
Possible Scenarios (Short-Term Period)
China-Russia Diplomatic Leverage Prevails: Beijing and Moscow maintain economic engagement and resource investments in Afghanistan and provide diplomatic support to bolster Taliban resistance to US pressures. Consequently, the Taliban refrains from any negotiations with Washington.
US Reasserts Military Presence: Washington applies political, economic, and security pressures on the Taliban, leading to a partial reoccupation of Bagram and weakening Taliban authority, creating divisions between moderate and hardline factions. China responds with economic and diplomatic actions, and Russia offers political backing, which escalates regional tensions, raises the possibility of proxy conflicts, and compels both nations to adopt a defensive stance.
Taliban Balance of Power Maximised: The Taliban leverages the US-China-Russia competition to gain as much as they can. This strategy allows the Taliban to strengthen its internal cohesion and international bargaining power, limit US influence, and protect China’s economic priorities and Russia’s engagement with the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.
