Denuclearisation and regional security: the contrast between North Korea’s position and South Korea’s vision

North Korea, South Korea, United States, Nuclear Weapons and Diplomacy_SpecialEurasia

Executive Summary

This report presents the core findings concerning Kim Jong-un’s recent comments on North Korea’s nuclear policy, South Korea’s stance on phased arms control, and the potential impact on the United States, China, and overall regional stability.

North Korea’s nuclear programme continues to be the primary source of instability in Northeast Asia. However, Kim’s willingness to talk to Washington, combined with President Lee Jae-myung’s support for halting production, hints at a potential for a small easing of tensions.

The report assesses how such developments may affect the security environment and the economic interests of regional actors.

Key Takeaways

  1. North Korea’s nuclear programme remains a significant threat to stability in the Asia-Pacific.
  2. Kim Jong-un’s conditional willingness to engage with the Trump administration opens a narrow pathway to stabilisation on the Korean Peninsula.
  3. The Korea Strait is a strategic node for the Northern Sea Route (NSR), linking Chinese ports with Europe, Japan, and South Korea.
  4. South Korea plays a dual role as a vital partner for the PRC in technology and industry while remaining a close ally of the United States under the Pivot to Asia policy.

Background Information

On September 21, 2025, Kim Jong-un addressed the Supreme People’s Assembly, stating North Korea would only negotiate with the United States if Washington ceased its denuclearisation demands. He reaffirmed Pyongyang would not relinquish nuclear weapons, describing sanctions as a factor that had strengthened regime resilience. The North Korean leader further condemned joint US-South Korean military exercises as rehearsals for nuclear conflict and dismissed gradual disarmament proposals as deceptive attempts to weaken the North.

South Korean President Lee Jae-myung responded in an interview with the BBC, noting that Pyongyang produces about 15–20 atomic bombs annually. He contended that halting production would be a major advancement, paving the way for mid-term discussions on arms reduction, and, eventually, total denuclearization, contingent upon the establishment of mutual trust and security assurances. Lee underlined gradual measures were the only realistic course of action.

Geopolitical Scenario

The Korean Peninsula holds strategic importance, bordering the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation to the north, and overlooking vital maritime routes including the Northern Sea Route and the Strait of Malacca. This geographic position ensures sustained attention from the United States, Russia, and the PRC.

Beijing has sought to mitigate risks from Pyongyang’s nuclear programme through two approaches. First, it promoted the “double freeze” doctrine, advocating a suspension of North Korean nuclear tests in parallel with US-South Korea joint exercises. Second, it cooperated with Washington to back UN resolutions against Pyongyang, signalling its role in multilateral forums. These strategies focused on stabilising the peninsula while also protecting China’s economic ties to South Korea.

In 2024, bilateral trade between Beijing and Seoul reached approximately $328 billion. For the first time in 30 years, South Korea experienced a trade deficit with China, attributed to a 20% decrease in exports (worth £124.8 billion) and an 8% reduction in imports (£142.8 billion). For Seoul, China remains an essential partner; for Beijing, stability on the peninsula remains critical. North Korea’s nuclear policy is the principal risk factor for both economies.

Kim’s proposition gives Washington a chance to renew discussions, while still keeping the US strategically focused on Korea. Washington views South Korea as a key military outpost to contain China and address the North’s nuclear threat. Measures, such as the 2017 deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) system and continued joint manoeuvres with the South Korean armed forces, reflect this.

Indicators to Monitor

  • The beginning of direct discussions between Kim Jong-un and Donald Trump.
  • The pace of militarisation on the Korean Peninsula, including nuclear developments and US-South Korea exercises.
  • Trade patterns between the PRC and South Korea.

Conclusion

For the foreseeable future, the Korean Peninsula will continue to experience increased instability. Kim Jong-un’s reluctance to disarm, despite hints of potential talks, implies North Korea will keep developing nukes while using negotiations to gain an advantage.

Joint military exercises between the US and South Korea, along with North Korea’s missile tests, heighten the chance of mistakes. For regional stakeholders, particularly China, the immediate priority will be to prevent escalation and preserve economic stability, while the United States will maintain pressure through military presence and sanctions enforcement.

In the medium term, the prospects for gradual stabilisation depend on whether dialogue materialises between Pyongyang and Washington. Should nuclear production be frozen, it might build trust, which could then lead to arms control talks.

This situation would allow South Korea to strengthen its position as both a US security ally and a Chinese trading partner. Any developments will be uncertain, considering Pyongyang’s dedication to keeping its weapons, which means the possibility of renewed conflict will remain, even amidst a period of reduced tensions.

Written by

  • Riccardo Rossi e1746976520751

    Geopolitical Analyst Asia-Pacific. He holds a Master’s degree in Political Science from the University of Milan, a master’s degree in Geopolitics and Global Security from La Sapienza University in Rome and a Diploma in European Affairs from the Institute of International Politics in Milan. He studies geopolitics and writes geo-strategic reports on the Asia-Pacific region.

    Read the author's reports

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