Executive Summary

This report assesses the recent Iranian counterterrorism operations in Sistan and Baluchestan Province targeting Jaish al-Adl, a Sunni militant organisation with a record of insurgency and cross-border activity.

The latest operations resulted in the elimination of several militants, following earlier attacks in July and August 2025, which caused civilian and police casualties. Jaish al-Adl’s insurgency continues to erode stability in the province, sustain sectarian fault-lines, and threaten regional relations.

Tehran’s actions show that the threat continues and that there is a danger of the situation worsening with Pakistan, where some members of the group are using safe havens.

Key Takeaways

1. Jaish al-Adl remains one of the most persistent militant threats to Iran’s southeastern frontier.
2. Iranian counterterrorism operations eliminated 13 militants of Jaish al-Adl.
3. Despite Iran’s substantial security measures, the continued presence of Sunni militancy highlights the persistent terrorist threat in the country.

Facts

On July 26 2025, militants from Jaish al-Adl (Army of Justice) attacked a courthouse in Sistan and Baluchestan Province, killing six civilians and wounding over twenty others. The attackers used guns and bombs, leading to a three-hour battle with Iranian security forces that left three attackers dead.

On August 10 2025, Jaish al-Adl launched another armed operation against a police station in the same province. The attack killed four people, including a police officer, before Iranian forces neutralised three militants and detained two others.

On August 28, 2025, Iranian authorities reported a counterterrorism campaign in the towns of Iranshahr, Khash and Saravan. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, police, and the Ministry of Intelligence were all involved in the hours-long operation that utilised drones and heavy weapons. Among the killed were thirteen militants affiliated with Jaish al-Adl, who had been involved in the July and August attacks. On the same day, Iranian authorities reported the discovery and seizure of a hidden workshop in the Chah Jamal region of Iranshahr. Jaish al-Adl owned this workshop and used it to produce explosives and suicide vests.

Iran has publicly accused Jaish al-Adl of operating from bases across the border in Pakistan’s Balochistan province. The group’s actions have, in the past, led to cross-border attacks by Iran, especially in January 2024, when Iran attacked what it believed were militant locations in Pakistan, following the deaths of Iranian border guards

Insurgent and terrorist violence repeatedly targeted Sistan and Baluchestan over the past two decades. Besides Jaish al-Adl, Iran has faced attacks from Islamic State affiliates targeting both security personnel and civilians.

Analysis

The sequence of attacks in July and August underscores Jaish al-Adl’s operational resilience and its capacity to strike symbolic and strategic targets. The group aimed to weaken the government and gain support through propaganda within Sunni Baluch communities by attacking the judiciary and law enforcement. With the use of heavy weapons and armed drones, the August counterterrorism operation shows Tehran’s focus on the insurgency and its political need to display control.

Jaish al-Adl’s strength lies in exploiting grievances among the Baluch Sunni minority, combined with its ability to utilise porous borders for mobility, sanctuary, and logistical networks. However, the group does not have the population’s support or supplies to expand its rebellion outside of the province. Therefore, it calibrates its actions to produce shock and instability instead of territorial control.

The external dimension remains strategically sensitive. Tehran’s repeated accusations of Islamabad’s complicity highlight the fragility of bilateral relations. Although Pakistani officials deny backing them, they have had difficulty controlling militant groups within their Balochistan province. Tehran’s history of unilateral cross-border strikes illustrates its willingness to act pre-emptively, with the attendant risk of diplomatic confrontation.

Iranian officials regularly attribute Jaish al-Adl activity to foreign adversaries, including Israel. This serves as both a political story and a method for understanding how Tehran views internal conflicts in relation to external dangers.

Implications

• Jaish al-Adl’s ability to launch occasional, attention-grabbing attacks means that Sistan and Baluchestan remains unstable.
• Tehran’s assertive counterterrorism measures may further alienate local Sunni populations, sustaining the recruitment base for insurgents.
• Iranian–Pakistani relations risk further deterioration if militant sanctuaries in Pakistan persist and Iranian cross-border strikes resume.
• Tehran may use broader regional narratives linking Jaish al-Adl to Israel or other external actors to reinforce its strategic posture but could obscure the group’s primarily local drivers.
• Sunni militancy, including Islamic State-linked operations, highlights Tehran’s ongoing exposure to asymmetric threats on its periphery.

Conclusion

Iran’s recent counterterrorism campaign against Jaish al-Adl shows both the state’s capacity and determination to suppress militant threats and the persistence of insurgency in the south-east.

Although Iranian forces might weaken Jaish al-Adl in terms of tactics, they cannot remove the social and geographical factors that help it survive. The insurgency remains too localised to threaten Iran’s national integrity but continues to impose costs on security forces, heighten sectarian tensions, and strain relations with Pakistan.

In the future, Tehran’s main strategic difficulty will be to control Jaish al-Adl militarily as well as handle the diplomatic consequences with Islamabad and resolve the persistent issues of its Baluch minority.