Executive Summary
This report assesses the geopolitical and geoeconomic significance of the Korean Peninsula for China, the United States, and Russia within the strategic context of the northern Asia-Pacific.
The analysis centres on three key areas: South Korea’s pivotal position in regional trade, the Korea Strait’s strategic value for the Northern Sea Route, and the security challenges presented by Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)’s militarisation.
The analysis highlights Beijing’s multifaceted strategy—economic, diplomatic, and military—aimed at maintaining influence over the Peninsula while countering US regional presence.
Key Takeaways
- In 2024, Seoul reaffirmed its position among the PRC’s principal trading partners, holding a central role in the regional technological and industrial value chain.
- The Korea Strait constitutes a strategic node along the Northern Sea Route (NSR), linking Chinese ports to Europe via the Bering Strait.
- The militarisation of the DPRK poses a significant threat to regional stability, prompting China, the United States, and Russia to pursue the containment of the Kim Jong-un regime.
Background Information
Lee Jae-myung’s victory in South Korea’s presidential election on June 3, 2025, ended the institutional crisis triggered by former President Yoon Suk-yeol’s December 3, 2024, declaration of martial law.
Despite restoring political and institutional stability, the Peninsula’s tensions reignited with the United States, South Korea, and Japan’s joint military exercises in the Sea of Japan on June 18, 2025.
Pyongyang responded immediately by launching medium-range ballistic missiles and issuing strong accusations against Seoul and Washington.
Geopolitical Scenario
In the northern Asia-Pacific, the Korean Peninsula possesses a pivotal geopolitical position. It borders the PRC and Russia to the north, faces the Yellow Sea to the west, the Sea of Japan to the east, and the Korea Strait to the south—an important maritime junction on the NSR.
This strategic location makes the Peninsula a focal point for the interests of Beijing, Moscow, and Washington.
Since 2012, under Xi Jinping’s leadership, China has intensified its engagement with the Korean Peninsula through a dual-track approach: expanding economic ties with Seoul while securing maritime and commercial interests, particularly access to the Korea Strait, considered vital for projecting influence along the southern corridor of the NSR.
Despite a decline in trade volumes, South Korea remains strategically essential to China’s economy. In 2023, bilateral trade fell by 16.2%, from USD 284.5 billion to USD 230.4 billion, driven primarily by a 20% drop in South Korean exports to China and an 8% reduction in Chinese imports. This contraction reflects Beijing’s growing technological self-sufficiency and Seoul’s strategic pivot towards the United States, which became South Korea’s primary trading partner in 2023.
In May 2025, China exported goods worth USD 12.6 billion to South Korea and imported goods valued at USD 14.5 billion, resulting in a trade deficit of USD 1.91 billion. Compared to May 2024, Chinese exports declined by 1.17%, and imports fell by 4.49%.
Major exports included integrated circuits (USD 2.2 billion), unspecified goods (USD 371 million), and computers (USD 312 million). China imported primarily integrated circuits (USD 7.22 billion), broadcasting accessories (USD 463 million), and cyclic hydrocarbons (USD 409 million). Mobile phones, inorganic salts, and batteries showed notable year-on-year export declines, as did mobile phones, other inorganic acid salts, and integrated circuits in imports.
Even with the economic slowdown, the strong economic ties between South Korea and China persist because of Seoul’s provision of advanced technologies and key intermediate goods, primarily in semiconductors and electronics, vital for China’s manufacturing and technological advancement.
China’s second economic vector concerning the Peninsula focuses on securing access to the Northern Sea Route (NSR)—an Arctic maritime corridor linking Northeast Asia to Europe, shortening transit routes by up to 30% (equivalent to 4,000–5,000 nautical miles) and reducing delivery times by as much as seven days. In 2023, the NSR handled 36.254 million tonnes of cargo, including over 2 million tonnes in international transit, dominated by energy products and strategic raw materials.
With a goal of 238 million tonnes of traffic by 2035, Russia, the lead nation in developing the route, is investing in nuclear icebreakers and Arctic port infrastructure. This project improves maritime logistics and is environmentally beneficial by shortening transit times between Murmansk and Northeast Asian ports.
Within this framework, the Korea Strait assumes a critical geoeconomic function as the southern NSR gateway, connecting China’s industrial system to European markets. This corridor lets China integrate Arctic routes into its logistics, saving time and money while improving access to Europe. Controlling the strait and its related infrastructure is strategically important for protecting trade between China and Europe and strengthening China’s global maritime presence.
However, the Korean Peninsula’s security context intrinsically links to this geoeconomic axis. The continued US military presence in South Korea and the instability stemming from the DPRK’s nuclear programme create persistent tensions with potential implications for critical maritime routes. Beijing’s response has been a multi-pronged containment strategy using diplomatic, economic, and military means, frequently in collaboration with Russia.
Diplomatically, China has promoted the “double freeze” proposal—simultaneously halting North Korean nuclear tests and US-ROK joint military exercises—as part of a broader attempt to stabilise the region through a rebalancing of deterrence.
Multilaterally, Beijing supported several UN Security Council resolutions aimed at curtailing the DPRK’s economic and military capacities. Resolution 2270 (March 2016) prohibited imports of coal, iron, gold, and other minerals, albeit with humanitarian exemptions that allowed China to continue coal imports exceeding USD 1 billion during the first nine months of that year. Resolution 2375 (September 2017) further restricted petroleum exports to Pyongyang, the employment of North Korean workers abroad, and maritime traffic suspected of sanctions evasion. However, inconsistent enforcement by Chinese economic actors suggests underlying strategic economic support.
On the military front, Sino-Russian cooperation has deepened through joint drills, strategic air patrols, and growing naval coordination. These operations include monitoring the land border with North Korea, securing maritime flows in the Yellow and Japan Seas, and establishing localised “sea control” zones around the Peninsula. This strategy seeks to limit the US Navy’s presence in the area, thereby preventing possible attacks on North Korean assets or targets close to China and Russia.
Conclusions
In the short term, the Korean Peninsula will remain a focal point of strategic competition among China, the United States, and Russia.
South Korea’s change in leadership should bring more stable governance, but it will not drastically change its relationship with the United States. Continued joint military drills among South Korea, the United States, and Japan might further anger North Korea, keeping regional tensions high.
Beijing’s policy will involve a two-pronged approach: fostering economic relations with Seoul, while simultaneously providing understated support to Pyongyang to act as a buffer against the United States.
Facing global sanctions, Russia might strengthen its partnership with China in the region, particularly in the maritime security and development of the Northern Sea Route.
Overall, the Korean Peninsula will remain a volatile flashpoint, where competing strategic interests intersect with critical trade corridors and defence postures.
