Executive Summary

This report assesses the strategic implications, current developments, and potential risks associated with the Trans-Afghan Railway, also referred to as the “Kabul Corridor”.

It outlines the geopolitical significance of Afghanistan as a transit hub linking Central Asia to the Indian Ocean. The analysis reviews also events and diplomatic interactions surrounding the project from 2010 to mid-2025.

The report concludes with forecast scenarios concerning regional stability, trade potential, and geopolitical alignment.

Key Takeaways

1. International and regional key players show their interests in promoting the “Kabul Corridor”.
2. Trans-Afghan Railway’s major challenges come from internal instability and terrorist groups’ activities in Afghanistan.
3. The successful construction and operation of the transport corridor could slash regional transport costs by as much as 40% and significantly improve Central Asia’s access to global markets via Indian Ocean ports.

Background Information

• 2010: Uzbek company finished the first the building of the first rail line to Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan.
• 2016: Completion of Turkmenistan’s 88 km rail segment to Akinah, Afghanistan, within the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Tajikistan corridor.
• 2017: Iran finished the construction of a 184 km railway to Herat, granting Afghanistan access to 11 international trade routes.
• 2018: Kabul Corridor formally introduced at the international conference “Central Asia in the system of international transport corridors: strategic prospects and unrealised opportunities”. Kazakhstan, Russia, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan signed a protocol to form a joint working group and financing consortium.
• 2019: Tashkent hosted the first multilateral meeting on railway transit through Afghanistan.
• 2020: Inaugural session of the “Central Asia–South Asia” Transport Platform.
• 2021 (February): Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan agreed on the roadmap for the Termez–Mazar-i-Sharif–Kabul–Peshawar route.
• 2021 (August): after the US troops’ withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Taliban return to power.
• Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan issued a joint security guarantee for transport projects in the region.
• 2023: the Taliban interim government opted for the Russian 1520mm track gauge across its section.
• 2024 (April): Termez hosted the first meeting of the working group tasked with developing the multimodal transport corridor connecting Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.
• 2025 (May). During a Kazan business forum, Russia reiterated its commitment to developing railway routes through Afghanistan, connecting to Pakistan and India, aiming to complete the Trans-Afghan Railway project’s feasibility study by early 2026.

Strategic Context

Because of its geography, Afghanistan is a key transit point, linking Central Asia to South Asian ports and providing greater access to maritime trade through Pakistan and Iran.

The Kabul Corridor connects with developing trade routes, such as the International North-South Transport Corridor (INTSC) and Beijing’s Chinese-Pakistan Economic Corridor. This infrastructure helps Russia circumvent Western-controlled trade routes, which are currently under sanctions.

Bilateral agreements, collaborative technical design, and high-level diplomatic events show active regional coordination along the corridor. The railway’s potential to handle 18–20 million tonnes of cargo annually indicate its relevance for regional economic recalibration.

Risk and Constraints

• Security Instability: The Taliban’s return in 2021 introduced persistent uncertainties. Although the group has ensured project safety, the Islamic State Wilayat Khorasan (ISKP) threat remains. Targeted violence and operational sabotage remain plausible scenarios.
• Political Recognition: The absence of international recognition for the Taliban government restricts formal diplomatic ties and financial assistance, impacting funding and undermining the stability of their governance.
• Regional Tensions: Diverging interests among Russia, China, and Pakistan introduce the risk of competitive agendas. The Chinese presence within the CPEC framework might complicate alignment with Russia’s rail standards.
• Economic Constraints: The project will cost between $4.5 and $8 billion, requiring ongoing investment. Despite initial interest from the World Bank, the Taliban’s rise to power in Kabul could restrict their official participation. Feasibility study results, cost-benefit forecasts, and route security evaluations remain incomplete.

Opportunities and Imperatives

• Regional Integration: The Kabul Corridor enables Central Asian republics to diversify trade partners and access seaports, mitigating landlocked disadvantages.
• Economic Stabilisation: Investments in infrastructure and increased freight transport can fuel job growth and stimulate Afghanistan’s internal markets, helping to curb illicit economies.
• Geopolitical Leverage: Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Afghanistan could gain diplomatic influence by participating in a transit corridor, which would also provide Moscow with a logistical workaround for Euro-Atlantic supply chains.

Forecast and Scenarios

Progressive Implementation (High Probability). With continued momentum and cooperation, the project could start construction by the end of 2025. The project team will complete the feasibility study by early 2026, with phased construction and route activation to follow between 2027 and 2030. Projected benefits include a 30–40% reduction in transport time and costs and a throughput capacity of 18–20 million tonnes annually.

Partial Stagnation because of Security Deterioration (Moderate Probability). A rise in attacks by ISKP or other militant groups could cause key players to reduce or end their involvement. Security concerns may delay or redirect project advancement through safer routes.

Political Disengagement by Key Actors (Low to Moderate Probability). Deteriorating relations between Russia, China, or regional states could jeopardise joint planning because of conflicting strategic objectives. Disagreements over gauges and customs could hinder integration, leaving the Taliban struggling to coordinate efforts.

Strategic Alignment and Accelerated Execution (Low Probability). The convergence of Russian, Chinese, Pakistani, and Central Asian interests could expedite project development through joint financing, unified engineering standards, and rapid construction. Such a development would require stabilised governance in Afghanistan and a conducive global financial environment.