Executive Summary
This report examines the resurgence of the Islamic State’s propaganda against Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa in the latest issue of al-Naba, a response to his attempts to engage with the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. The report details internal security threats, geopolitical shifts, and the dangers of jihadist insurgency.
The Islamic State has framed al-Sharaa’s government as apostate and accused it of collaboration with foreign adversaries. This intelligence aims to assess the implications of these developments for regional stability and the integrity of the new Syrian regime.
Key Takeaways
- The Islamic State is intensifying ideological attacks against al-Sharaa to delegitimise his rule.
- Damascus has engaged in secret negotiations with Israel, mediated by Azerbaijan, with Turkish participation.
- Arrests of Palestinian militants show a calculated effort by the Syrian government to signal distance from Iranian proxies and provoke Israeli restraint.
Background Information
On May 15, 2025, the Islamic State released Issue 495 of al-Naba, targeting Ahmed al-Sharaa, former leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and current president of Syria. After Bashar al-Assad’s regime fell in December 2024, Al-Sharaa took power the following January.
In al-Naba 495, the Islamic State attacked al-Sharaa after his meeting in Saudi Arabia with US President Donald Trump and Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman.
During this meeting, the United States agreed to lift all sanctions on Syria in exchange for commitments to normalise relations with Israel. The parties also discussed reducing jihadist activity, focusing on foreign fighters operating in northern Syria.
These discussions coincided with news of covert Syria-Israel negotiations in Baku, attended by senior Israeli security officials, Turkish representatives, and members of Syria’s new leadership.
In this context, the Russian information analytical portal Rybar reported that Syrian security forces have begun operations in Idlib and Hama against field commanders who arrived in the country to participate in the jihad against Assad’s regime. The Telegram channel highlighted the Syrian forces’ focused efforts to eliminate Palestinian fighters. Al-Sharq al-Awsat reported that Syrian security forces had begun an operation against ISIS fighters, interpreting this as a sign of a “new Syria” following the meeting between al-Sharaa and Donald Trump.
Al-Naba 495: Analysing Islamic State’s Narrative Against Al-Sharaa
- Delegitimisation of al-Sharaa through Accusations of Apostasy and Treason. The article delegitimised al-Sharaa, called in the entire text with his nom de guerre Muhammad al-Jolani and still considered the leader of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). The Islamic State defined him as a traitor to Islam who has abandoned Tawhid (توحيد), the Islamic principle of monotheism. The narrative claims his political pragmatism compromised doctrinal purity, citing his pursuit of Western approval, symbolised by meeting Trump. The Islamic State depicts these actions not merely as political miscalculations but as doctrinal betrayals, placing al-Sharaa among the murtaddīn (apostates) and legitimising violence against him.
- Opposition to Political Engagement with the West. The narrative condemns any political engagement with Western powers, particularly the United States, portraying it as evidence of submission, weakness, and betrayal. Political solutions are depicted as forbidden compromises. The author uses the phrase “عبودية تامة” (total slavery) to depict HTS’s alleged dependence on US approval, framing their actions as servitude rather than strategic manoeuvres.
- Glorification of the Islamic State and Vindication of Its Methods. Al-Naba elevates the Islamic State ideology and governance model as the only legitimate and doctrinally sound approach. It portrays the Islamic State as a divinely guided group that predicted HTS’s ideological compromise. By highlighting the difference between the Islamic State’s strict adherence to al-walāʾ wa al-barāʾ and al-Sharaa’s purported political compromises, the text positions the Islamic State as the sole defender of genuine Islamic principles.
- Rejection of Democracy and Modern Political Structures. The article’s narrative constructs a theological and ideological opposition between tawhid and democracy, claiming they are incompatible. According to the text, involvement in Western-style democracies is incompatible with Islam. References to “الديمقراطية” (democracy) as idolatry or shirk (polytheism), an unforgivable sin in Salafi-jihadist thought, reinforce this dichotomy.
- Call to Defect and Rejoin the Islamic State. Al-Naba’s text serves as both condemnation and a recruitment drive, urging former allies, fighters, and disenchanted HTS members to rejoin the Islamic State. It appeals to personal guilt, spiritual accountability, and religious obligation, offering a path to redemption through repentance and rejoining the ranks of the terrorist organisation.
Risk Scenario
Al-Naba Issue 495 and an April 2025 video, part of the Islamic State’s propaganda campaign, label President al-Sharaa an apostate and traitor. This is part of a wider propaganda campaign to discredit Syria’s new Islamist government by portraying it as collaborating with its enemies, primarily the United States, Turkey, and Israel. The goal of this narrative is to weaken the internal unity of Syria’s jihadist factions and undermine their popular support.
Arrests of Palestinian radicals, including ex-HTS member Shamil al-Ghazi, signal a tactical shift by Damascus. The government is focusing on foreign militants whose actions risk provoking Israeli retaliation. In contrast, groups like the Turkestan Islamic Party, with links to Central Asia, are less affected and supposedly still conditionally support the new government.
The recent diplomatic initiatives towards Israel coupled with selective crackdowns on militants signal a deliberate strategic repositioning. The proposal also seeks to reconcile international approval with the acceptance of internal jihadists. Bringing former extremists into government and security roles, however, poses a long-term threat of infiltration, sabotage, or ideological uprisings.
In the short term, this narrative might exacerbate ideological fragmentation within jihadist circles operating in north-western Syria. By openly denouncing al-Sharaa and HTS as apostates and collaborators, al-Naba Issue 495 encourages acts of hostility from Islamic State supporters. These could manifest as targeted killings, sabotage operations, or internal mutinies within HTS-held areas, particularly from individuals or cells previously sympathetic to the Islamic State. This ideology could re-energise Islamic State members, who might take advantage of the Syrian security apparatus’ weakening position.
Over the medium term, this narrative may contribute to a strategic reorganisation of Islamic State networks in Syria and beyond. Framing rejoining the Islamic State as a religious imperative could facilitate the re-establishment of covert networks and reinforce its manpower and ideological foundations. The narrative undermines political Islam by emphasising past failures and broken alliances, pushing support toward a more extreme, inflexible ideology. This situation presents a major security risk regionally, possibly enhancing Islamic State’s ability to recruit and operate in the Near East and vulnerable areas such as Iraq, Libya, and the Sahel.
Disclaimer. This report is part of the Terrorism Intelligence Threat project, directed by Giuliano Bifolchi, and is intended solely for research and analytical purposes. The inclusion of images or references to the Islamic State and its publication al-Naba does not imply endorsement or support of their narratives. All materials are used exclusively to investigate and understand jihadist propaganda and terrorism dynamics.
