Afghanistan: the Killing of a Chinese Worker Might Compromise the Sino-Taliban Relations

China Afghanistan relations after the killing of a Chinese worker_SpecialEurasia

Geopolitical Report ISSN 2785-2598 Volume 50 Issue 9
Author: Giuliano Bifolchi

Executive Summary

The recent targeted killings of Chinese citizens in Afghanistan pose a significantly increased security risk to China’s interests in the country. The latest incident, the murder of a Chinese national in the Takhar province on January 21st, 2025, underscores a growing trend of violence against Chinese citizens involved in mining operations.

This report, based on publicly available information (PAI), evaluates the geopolitical and security implications of these events, focusing specifically on the Sino-Taliban relationship. The analysis considers also the role of militant groups operating across the border and forecasts potential outcomes that could affect Beijing’s strategic objectives in Central Asia and its broader regional influence.

Background Information

On January 21st, 2025, in Takhar province, northern Afghanistan, the Islamic State Wilayat Khorasan (ISKP) fighters killed a Chinese national returning to the provincial capital, Taloqan. The victim worked at a local gold mine, a key sector attracting increasing numbers of Chinese nationals since the Taliban’s 2021 return to power.

A similar incident in November 2024 targeted Chinese nationals working in Tajikistan’s Khatlon region’s gold mining sector; militants reportedly crossed from northern Afghanistan to conduct the attack. The attacks have raised alarm in Beijing regarding the safety of its citizens and investments in the region.

In response to the Takhar incident, Beijing’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a formal protest, calling for a thorough investigation and demanding improved protection for Chinese citizens in Afghanistan. This is the first public diplomatic rebuke from China towards the Taliban in the three years since the latter’s return to power, signalling a shift in Beijing’s approach to its relationship with the Taliban.

Analysis

Strategic Imperatives and Constraints of Involved Actors

  • China: Beijing’s strategic interests in Afghanistan, particularly in the extraction of natural resources like gold, are central to its broader goals in the region. Afghanistan’s mineral wealth, which is part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), offers significant economic returns. Safeguarding Chinese nationals and investments within the mining sector has become paramount; sustained violence could discourage foreign investment and impede China’s economic objectives in the region. Anti-China sentiment, partly fuelled by the treatment of Uighurs in Xinjiang, and the ideological motives behind the attacks, worsen Beijing’s concerns. Although China wields significant economic power, the sensitive nature of Sino-Taliban relations limits its ability to deploy military or direct action against Taliban forces. Diplomatic pressure remains Beijing’s preferred method of engagement, but the Taliban’s limited capacity to provide security makes this approach increasingly untenable. China, which recently expressed its interest in the Wakhan Corridor, must balance its demands for security with broader geopolitical concerns, especially regarding its ties with neighbouring states such as Tajikistan and Russia.
  • The Taliban: The Taliban’s primary imperative is the consolidation of power and securing international legitimacy, both of which are threatened by its inability to maintain order and protect foreign nationals, especially Chinese nationals whose investments are crucial to Afghanistan’s struggling economy. However, Taliban opposition to foreign involvement creates difficulties for their collaboration with China, especially in regions vulnerable to insurgency. Several factors, including internal divisions, limited resources, and the difficulties inherent in governing a conflict-ridden state, impede the Taliban’s ability to act decisively. The presence of different terrorist and jihadist groups inside the Afghan territory further complicates the situation and undermines Kabul’s strategy to attract foreign investors and improve the country’s socioeconomic conditions.
  • Non-state Actors: Militants in the Afghan-Tajik border region, including those with ties to broader jihadist movements, view attacks against Chinese nationals as an opportunity to resist Beijing’s influence in the region and extract financial gain. These groups, especially the ISKP, might exploit the Sino-Taliban relations and spread jihadist propaganda targeting both Beijing and the current Afghan government. The propaganda might portray the Chinese presence in the region as a form of neo-imperialism, exacerbating tensions and providing a rationale for violence. The economic rewards from such attacks, including ransom and looting, further incentivise these actors to target Chinese citizens.

Forecasting

Several potential developments could unfold in the short to medium term:

  1. Continued Targeting of Chinese Nationals: If the current trend persists, it is likely that attacks on Chinese nationals and assets will intensify. Such a development would pose a significant risk to Beijing’s economic stake in Afghanistan, notably in the mining sector, potentially leading to a revaluation of its investment approach or disengagement from certain projects.
  2. Diplomatic Strain Between China and the Taliban: The recent diplomatic protest from Beijing suggests that China is growing more vocal in its dissatisfaction with the Taliban’s inability to secure Chinese nationals. Continued attacks may necessitate a more forceful diplomatic and economic response from China towards the Taliban, involving the strategic partnership of regional actors like Tajikistan and Russia.
  3. Internal Taliban Challenges: The Taliban may face growing internal pressure to address the rising insecurity in Afghanistan. This could lead to an internal power struggle, with factions either pushing for more aggressive action against foreign nationals or seeking to appease China to secure economic aid. The Taliban’s failure to control militancy could further erode its legitimacy in the eyes of the international community.
  4. Regional Shift in Alliances: The targeting of Chinese nationals could prompt Beijing to strengthen ties with other Central Asian states, particularly Tajikistan, to secure its investments and regional influence. This shift may deteriorate the Sino-Taliban relations and decrease the Chinese economic support to Kabul. The resulting reduction in financial support will necessitate the Taliban’s pursuit of alternative economic alliances with Russia and the Gulf Arab states.
  5. Increasing Jihadist Propaganda and Violent Attacks: The Taliban’s weakening position, because of the ineffective counterterrorism efforts and a reduced Chinese economic involvement, could incentivise jihadist organisations, especially the ISKP, to intensify their propaganda campaigns against the Afghan government and orchestrate further violence. Instability in Afghanistan will likely weaken the Taliban government, exacerbating internal divisions and potentially leading to a power struggle.

Conclusion

The murder of a Chinese national in Takhar underscores the escalating security risks for Chinese nationals in the Afghan-Tajik border region and reflects broader challenges to Sino-Taliban relations. The Taliban’s failure to maintain security, compounded by escalating aggression from militant factions, presents substantial challenges to China’s regional strategic goals, especially within the mining industry. With the escalation of violence, Beijing’s Afghanistan policy needs reassessment, possibly involving heightened diplomatic pressure on the Taliban and pursuing alternative regional alliances. The developing dynamics of Sino-Taliban relations will have profound implications for China’s geopolitical positioning in Central Asia and its broader influence in the region.


Picture: The meeting between Mawlawi Mohammad Yaqoob “Mujahid”, Acting Minister of National Defence of Afghanistan, and the Chinese Special Envoy on Afghanistan, Yue Xiaoyong (Credits: Official Twitter Account of Ministry of National Defence of Afghanistan)

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